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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO

KEVIN PLANK,) CASE NO. 1:06 CV 1141
Plaintiff,) JUDGE DONALD C. NUGEN
v.) MEMORANDIM OF ORTHON
USDOJ/FBI, et al.,) <u>MEMORANDUM OF OPINION</u>) <u>AND ORDER</u>
Defendants.)

On May 8, 2006, plaintiff pro se Kevin Plank filed this in forma pauperis action against the following defendants: USDOJ/FBI, United States Treasury Department, U.S. Defense Intelligence Agency, U.S. Central Intelligence Agency, and U.S. Department of Homeland Security. The complaint alleges that the United States government knew of the September 11, 2001 attacks before they occurred. It is further alleged that this information was transferred to plaintiff "at an early age," and that he has suffered injury professionally and personally as a result. For the reasons stated below, this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

Although <u>pro se</u> pleadings are liberally construed, <u>Boag</u>

<u>v. MacDougall</u>, 454 U.S. 364, 365 (1982) (per curiam); <u>Haines v.</u>

Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972), the district court is required to dismiss an action under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, or if it lacks an arguable basis in law or fact.¹ Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319 (1989);
Lawler v. Marshall, 898 F.2d 1196 (6th Cir. 1990); Sistrunk v. City of Strongsville, 99 F.3d 194, 197 (6th Cir. 1996).

Principles requiring generous construction of <u>pro se</u> pleadings are not without limits. <u>Beaudett v. City of Hampton</u>, 775 F.2d 1274, 1277 (4th Cir. 1985). A complaint must contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the material elements of some viable legal theory to satisfy federal notice pleading requirements. <u>See Schied v. Fanny Farmer Candy Shops, Inc.</u>, 859 F.2d 434, 437 (6th Cir. 1988). District courts are not required to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them. <u>Beaudett</u> at 1278. To do so would "require ... [the courts] to explore exhaustively all potential claims of a <u>pro se</u> plaintiff, ... [and] would...transform the district court from its legitimate advisory role to the improper role of an advocate seeking out the strongest arguments and most successful strategies for a party." <u>Id.</u>

A claim may be dismissed <u>sua sponte</u>, without prior notice to the plaintiff and without service of process on the defendant, if the court explicitly states that it is invoking section 1915(e) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)] and is dismissing the claim for one of the reasons set forth in the statute.

McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 608-09 (6th Cir. 1997);

Spruytte v. Walters, 753 F.2d 498, 500 (6th Cir. 1985), cert.

denied, 474 U.S. 1054 (1986); Harris v. Johnson, 784 F.2d 222, 224 (6th Cir. 1986); Brooks v. Seiter, 779 F.2d 1177, 1179 (6th Cir. 1985).

Even liberally construed, the complaint does not contain allegations reasonably suggesting plaintiff might have a valid federal claim. See, Lillard v. Shelby County Bd. of Educ,, 76 F.3d 716 (6th Cir. 1996) (court not required to accept summary allegations or unwarranted legal conclusions in determining whether complaint states a claim for relief).

Further, the court takes judicial notice of its own records in observing that this is at least the fifth frivolous lawsuit filed by plaintiff in this court, and the third essentially identical action against the defendants in this case.² Federal courts have both the inherent power and constitutional obligation to protect their jurisdiction from conduct which impairs the ability to carry out Article III functions. Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069, 1073 (11th Cir. 1986). Moreover, this court has the responsibility to prevent litigants from unnecessarily encroaching on judicial machinery needed by others. <u>Id</u>. To achieve these ends, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit has approved enjoining vexatious and harassing litigants by requiring them to obtain leave of court before submitting additional filings. Filipas v. Lemons, 835 F.2d 1145 (6th Cir. 1987); Wrenn_v. Vanderbilt Univ. Hosp., Nos. 94-5453, 94-5593, 1995 WL 111480 (6th Cir. Mar. 15, 1995) (authorizing a court to enjoin harassing litigation under its inherent authority and the All Writs Act, 28

² See, Plank v. USDOJ/FBI, 1:06 CV 70; Plank v. Sallie Mae, 1:05 CV 2833; Plank v. USDOJ/FBI, 1:05 CV 2509; Plank v. U.S. Dept. of Education, 1:05 CV 2255.

U.S.C. § 1651(a) (citations omitted)).3

Plaintiff has established a pattern of filing complaints in this court which are duplicative, patently frivolous and vexatious, and which appear calculated to harass the court and abuse the judicial process. Accordingly, Kevin Plank is permanently enjoined from filing any new lawsuits or other documents without seeking and obtaining leave of court in accordance with the following:

- 1. He must file a "Motion Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File" with any document he proposes to file and he must attach a copy of this Order to it (any such motion should be filed in a miscellaneous case).
- 2. As an exhibit to any motion seeking such leave, he must also attach a declaration which has been prepared pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 or a sworn affidavit certifying that (1) the document raises a new issue which has never been previously raised by him in this or any other court, (2) the claim or issue is not frivolous, and (3) the document is not filed in bad faith.
- 3. By means of a second exhibit, he must identify and list: (a) the full caption of each and every suit which has been previously filed by him or on his behalf in any court against each and every defendant in any new suit he wishes to file, and (b) the full caption of each and every suit which he has currently pending.

Other circuits have endorsed enjoining these types of filers. See, Day v. Allstate Ins. Co.,788 F.2d 1110 (5th Cir.1986); Cotner v. Hopkins, 795 F.2d 900 (10th Cir. 1986); Procup v. Strickland, 792 F.2d 1069 (11th Cir. 1986); Franklin v. Murphy, 745 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1984); In re Martin-Trigona, 763 F.2d 140 (2d Cir. 1985); In re Green, 669 F.2d 779 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (per curiam); Green v. Warden, 699 F.2d 364 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 960 (1983); Green v. White, 616 F.2d 1054 (8th Cir. 1980) (per curiam); Gordon v. Dep't of Justice, 558 F.2d 618 (1st Cir. 1977); Gambocz v. Yelencsics, 468 F.2d 837 (3d Cir. 1972).

4. As a third exhibit to the motion, he must provide a copy of each complaint identified and listed in accordance with the foregoing paragraph 3 and a certified record of its disposition.

The court may deny any motion for leave to file if the proposed document is frivolous, vexatious or harassing. If the motion is denied, the document shall not be filed. Further, plaintiff's failure to comply with the terms of this Order shall be sufficient ground for this court to deny any motion for leave to file, and may be considered an act of contempt for which he may be punished accordingly.

Further, to prevent further harassment of the court by plaintiff and the waste of this court's limited resources, the Clerk's Office is hereby ordered as follows:

- (1) Any document submitted by Plank prior to his obtaining leave to file shall not be filed unless it is specifically identified as a "Motion Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File," and unless it contains: 1) an affidavit or sworn declaration as required by this order; 2) a copy of this Memorandum of Opinion; and, 3) the exhibits required by this Memorandum of Opinion.
- (2) The Clerk's Office shall not accept any filing fees, CIS forms, cover sheets, in forma pauperis applications, summonses, or U.S. Marshal Forms, in connection with any Motion Pursuant to Court Order Seeking Leave to File which Plank files, unless and until leave is granted.

Accordingly, plaintiff's request to proceed in forma

pauperis is granted and this action is dismissed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e). Further, the court CERTIFIES pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1915(a)(3) that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.the court certifies, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(3), that an appeal from this decision could not be taken in good faith.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

DONALD C. NUGENT

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE